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1 Introduction
Trade preferences have long been a central policy offered by developed countries in
order to encourage exports from developing countries. The European Union (EU)
has been a key player, granting unilateral preferential access to its market since the
early 1970s via its preferences for the ACP1 group of countries, through its Gener-
alised System of Preferences (GSP), and since 2001 via the Everything but Arms
(EBA) initiative for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Other developed coun-
tries, notably the US, Canada and Japan have also offered improved access under
GSP, and GSP-style schemes such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), or the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In more recent years, emerging
developing countries such as India have also started to offer preferential access to
less developed countries.2 In the WTO, preferential access is covered under Article
XXXVI of the GATT where the explicit motivation is to facilitate the growth and
diversification of LDC exports ”so as to provide them with expanding resources
for their economic development”.3
Unilateral preferences are a central pillar of the EU’s strategy towards develop-
ing countries. The Lome convention, signed in 1975, allowed for preferential access
to the EU for a group of 46 African Caribbean and Pacific states who were largely
EU ex-colonies. This was replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement which pro-
vided for preferential access for 78 ACP states. For the period under consideration
in this paper, under the GSP system, the EU had three variants: (i) The standard
arrangement which offered preferential access to the EU market for developing
countries in the form of reduced and zero tariffs for just over 70% of all goods.
(ii) The GSP+ scheme which provided for the full removal of tariffs on largely the
same products as those covered by the general GSP arrangement, and consequently
reduced tariffs on a much smaller range of goods. These enhanced preferences were
granted to countries who ratified and implemented certain international conven-
tions relating to human and labour rights, environment and good governance. (iii)
Everything But Arms (EBA) where 49 Least Developed Countries were granted
duty free quota free access to the EU on all products, excluding weapons since
2001.4 In 2014 a revised GSP scheme came into operation broadly with the same
three variants but where a key change concerned the country eligibility criteria,
such that the scheme was focussed more on those developing countries most in
need.
The channels by which increased trade might impact on development are var-
ied: increased export earnings, gains from specialisation according to comparative
advantage, economies of scale, impact on productivity, impact on investment and
capital accumulation, technology transfer, greater incentives to improve domes-
tic physical and institutional infrastructures, as well as improved access to higher
quality intermediates. Consequently and given the centrality of preferences for
1 African, Caribbean, Pacific.
2 India for example is proposing to offer duty-free, quota free access to 49 less developed
countries.
3 GATT Article XXXVI.
4 In addition to weapons, banana and rice were excluded from EBA between 2006 and 2009,
and sugar was transitioned until 2012 with minimum prices.
The Impact of Preferences on Developing Countries’ Exports 3
trade in development policy, it is important to understand whether trade prefer-
ences have had the expected positive impact on exports.
Unilateral preferences may impact on trade both directly and indirectly. In the
first instance there is the preferential tariff effect - the lowering or removal of tariffs
vis--vis exporters should lead to more trade. That increase in trade could either be
at the intensive margin through increasing the level of already existing trade flows;
or at the extensive margin by either encouraging product diversification, or the
exports of the existing set of products to new markets. Preferential regimes could
also have a secondary indirect impact on trade for the preference giving country.
This could occur through more relaxed rules of origin; or through the interaction
between the preference regime and any on-going trade-related technical assistance
facilitating trade; and/or through any investment, domestic or foreign, in export
industries, which may also have been stimulated by the presence of the preferences.
There are also a number of reasons why unilateral preferences may not have
the desired trade effects. This could be because of the underlying complexity of
the proffered regimes such as the rules of origin; or from the erosion of prefer-
ences as a result of the significant expansion in free trade agreements and from
on-going multilateral trade liberalisation; from the conditionality which may be
attached to some of the preference regimes with regard to domestic governance
(as in the EU’s GSP+ scheme); from the exclusion of key products from a number
of schemes; from the uncertainty regarding the duration of the schemes; from the
graduation clauses which are often built in; and from the possible distortionary
impact of preference schemes which might encourage countries to specialise in ar-
eas in which they perhaps do not have a comparative advantage.
A number of empirical papers have analysed the impact on trade of prefer-
ential regimes. The evidence from the existing literature, which typically focuses
either on EU or US preferential schemes, is somewhat mixed. Some papers indi-
cate that preferences do impact positively on trade flows (see for example, Hoek-
man et.al., 2006, 2008; Ianchovichina et.al., 2001; Goldstein, 2003; Fraser and Van
Biesebroeck, 2010; Agostino et.al 2007; Collier and Venables, 2007; Di Rubbo and
Canali, 2008; Nilsson, 2009; Davis and Nilsson, 2013, Gamberoni, 2007; Lederman
and Ozden, 2007; Subramaniam and Wei, 2007; Fugazza and Nicita, 2011; Cipol-
lina, Laborde, and Salvatici 2013, Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010); while others find
mixed evidence (Aiello, 2009, 2010) or suggest the converse. Ames (1993) suggests
that the impact of preferential access to the US market for Caribbean economies
was limited because of the improved access the US gave to competitors under
other arrangements, such as the FTA with Mexico, and because of the variability
associated with sugar quotas. Brenton and Hoppe (2006) suggest that while US
AGOA preferences might have increased trade the more significant constraints on
trade relate to domestic supply side constraints, poor infrastructure, and weak
policy environments (see also Frankel 2010, Hoekman and Ozden 2006, and Ed-
wards and Lawrence 2010). Ozden and Rienhardt (2004) argue that GSP schemes
can discourage countries from undertaking domestic liberalisation, and that the
uncertainty regarding the duration of GSP regimes can discourage investment.
They find that countries’ export performance improved once they were no longer
part of the US’ GSP scheme. Similarly Persson and Wilhelmsson (2007) and Herz
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and Wagner (2007, 2011), who cover a wide range of GSP schemes since the 1950s,
suggest that while unilateral preference may increase exports in the short-run, in
the long run trade is lower. There is also work suggesting little impact either on
diversification (Collier and Venables, 2007), or on encouraging higher value chain
activity (Edwards and Lawrence, 2010). There are, however significant limitations
to much of the existing literature, in particular the frequent use of aggregate trade
data whereas preferences are granted at the product level, the inability to correctly
capture preference regimes leading to the widespread use of dummy variables or
the use of incorrectly specified preference margins. The central objective of this
paper is to assess whether unilateral preferences have had an effect on exports to
the EU more precisely than heretofore by addressing these lacunae.
We overcome the limitations outlined above by using a unique dataset on coun-
try and product level exports to the EU for the period 2002-2008. The dataset
allows us to match for each partner country and for each product line at 10-
digit level (Combined Nomenclature CN-10), the value of the trade flow with the
trade regime actually used (i.e. whether the measured flow entered using GSP
preferences, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) regime or used some other trade
preferences) and the actual tariff associated with that particular trade flow. This
enables us to estimate a highly disaggregated bilateral gravity model and to con-
tribute to the existing literature in several respects. First, it allows us to evaluate
more precisely the direct effect of preferential access by using the actual tariff at
the product line level rather than a dummy variable which is typically used with
more aggregated trade. Secondly because our data enables us to precisely capture
the direct tariff effect, we can then use preference margins and regime dummies
in order to shed light on additional indirect impacts of trade preferences. Finally,
building on the recent work of French (2012), we use product specific control vari-
ables in our regressions.
Overall, our results confirm that preferential regimes have been effective in
increasing trade - lower tariffs and larger preference margins increase trade. With
regard to the intensive margin we find that the FTA, GSP+, EBA and GSP
regimes have been the most effective (and typically in that order), with a smaller
and sometimes negative coefficient associated with the Cotonou regime. When
considering all potential trade, at both the intensive and the extensive margin, we
find that tariffs and preference margins have a smaller impact on trade, and that
the additional effects on trade of the regimes that we can identify in the data, the
EBA and GSP regime, are no longer positive. In all our specifications we also find
that it is important to correctly define the preferential margin, as the size of the
margin effect is sensitive to the definition. The effect on exports is larger when the
margin is calculated in relation to MFN tariffs or to the average tariff than when
taking our preferred measures, which take into account the degree of competition
for each specific product.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the channels and the em-
pirical literature evaluating the impact of trade preferences. Section 3 outlines the
coverage and use of preferential regimes in the EU. Section 4 specifies the gravity
model to be used. Section 5 describes the data and methodology used. Section
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6 estimates the impact of trade preferences on the intensive and the extensive
margin of trade.5 The last section concludes.
2 Depth, breadth and utilisation of preferential regimes in the EU
The EU currently has reciprocal and/or unilateral preferences with virtually all
countries in the American and African continents.6 Agreements differ in terms
of product coverage and the preference margin being offered, which in turn is a
function not only of the preferential tariff, but also of the size of the MFN tariff
and the actual tariff applicable to competitors.7
As outlined earlier the EU’s GSP scheme contains three variants, and the key
differences between them can be seen in table 1. The table shows the differences
in coverage and depth between the GSP, GSP+ and the EBA regimes, across the
years in our sample. The first element to note is the number of tariff lines with
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) zero rates which apply to all exporting countries.
For these products, therefore, there is no preference margin, and the number of
these increased from 16% to 22% of all tariff lines. The standard GSP scheme offers
preferential access to developing countries in the form of either zero or reduced
tariffs for their goods. In 2008 33.53% of tariff lines were duty free, and for 36.04%
of tariff lines there was a positive though preferential tariff. In 8.32% of cases there
was a positive MFN tariff to pay. The GSP+ offers improved preferences to coun-
tries who ratified and implemented international conventions relating to human
and labour rights, environment and good governance. In contrast to the standard
GSP, 68.15% of tariff lines were duty free, and for only 2.11% of tariff lines was
there a positive preferential tariff. In 7.64% of cases there was a positive MFN
tariff to pay. In the case of Everything But Arms (EBA) least developed countries
have virtually duty free access in the EU market. 67.52% of tariff lines were duty
free, there was a positive preferential tariff for 0.04% of tariff lines, and there was
a positive MFN tariff in only 0.34% of cases.
The coverage and depth of trade preferences also varies across product and
sectors. The larger MFN tariffs are in agricultural products, food processing and
textiles. However, these larger tariffs imply larger margins only with respect to the
EBA and GSP+ regime, since GSP and Cotonou tariffs are positive on average
for these sectors. In addition, most average MFN tariffs have decreased from 2002
to 2008. Although they represent a small reduction, preference margins have been
5 In this paper, the intensive margin of trade refers to changes in the level of already existing
trade flows. As we only have one destination market, the EU, the extensive margin refers to
new products being exported by a given country at some point during our time period to the
EU, where previously that product was not being exported by that country to the EU.
6 Excluding the US, Venezuela and Cuba in America and Mauritania in Africa.
7 While the importance of unilateral preferences varies across exporters, it is worth noting
that trade under these regimes is of comparatively low importance for the EU itself. More
than 60% of total imports in the EU are in duty free tariff lines. Around 23% of the remaining
imports face positive MFN tariffs, either because exporters are not eligible for preferences or
because they do not utilise them. The share of imports using preferential regimes is only 15%,
and more than half of this utilises other preferential regimes. The de facto share of EU imports
via GSP/EBA is around 5%.
6 Xavier Cirera et al.
Table 1 Coverage of EU Preferential regimes (share of tariff lines).
2002 2008
GSP GSP+** EBA GSP GSP+ EBA
MFN = 0 16.45 16.45 16.45 22.11 22.11 22.11
MFN ¿ 0 (no preference) 12.34 8.12 0.23 8.32 7.64 0.34
Pref. Duty Free 37.11 72.14 83.32 33.53 68.15 77.52
Positive pref. Tariff 34.1 3.29 0 36.04 2.11 0.04
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CARIS (2010). GSP+** in 2002 refers to the special arrangement for drug trafficking
prevention.
squeezed further, and for some minerals and manufactured sectors are below 2.5%.
In addition to differential coverage across regimes, countries may be eligible for
more than one preferential regime. For example, most EBA and GSP exporters
could until 2008 also enter the EU using the Cotonou Agreement. Similarly those
ACP countries that signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU could
either use the EPA regime or the relevant GSP preference scheme. Furthermore,
not all product lines have the same relevance for exporting countries, since this
depends on each country export basket.
CARIS (2011) show that the importance of eligible preferences for existing
exports varies by country, and there are striking differences. There are countries
where the preferences and preference eligibility is somewhat insignificant typically
due to a narrow export basket, and where most export flows are in any case eligi-
ble for the MFN=0 regime. This applies, for example, to Lesotho where 98.73% of
exports to the EU face zero MFN tariffs, and similarly for Liberia (98.84%), East
Timor(98.89%), Rwanda (98.94%) and the Central African Republic (99.03%).
On the other hand there are countries such as Bangladesh who export primarily
using preference eligible lines, with only 0.95% of existing exports eligible under
MFN=0. A similar pattern is observed for countries such as Jamaica (2.91%) or
Swaziland (3.78%).
In addition to preference eligibility, another important factor is whether pref-
erences are utilised. The data shows that non-utilisation of preferences also varies
substantially across countries and products. While most countries utilise most of
their preferences, there is small cluster of countries with large preference non-
utilisation as figure 1 shows.8
The preceding serves to highlight that the correct assessment of the impact
of trade preferences on export flows requires identifying the depth and breadth
of preferences that each scheme offers. Typically, and primarily due to the lack
of available data, gravity models have resorted to the use of dummy variables
to measure this impact. This, however, is misleading and potentially incorrect in
four dimensions. First, because it associates bilateral flows to a preferential regime
without considering the preferential lines being offered. Secondly, it does not take
8 Some example of countries with significant exports to the EU and very large non-utilisation
rates in 2007 (100% of preference eligible exports exported MFN) are Bouvet Island, Iraq,
Kiribati and Palau
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Fig. 1 Probability Distribution Function of Preference Non-utilisation Exports as a Share of
Eligible Exports in 2007, by Country. Source: Author’s own calculations
into consideration the extent of the preference margin. Thirdly, it fails to take into
account the utilisation of the preferential regimes. Finally, dummy variables give
equal weight across preferential regimes, and in the case of overlapping prefer-
ences, cannot clearly distinguish between the impact of each separate agreement.
Our dataset and methodology allow us to address these concerns.
3 The gravity model and unilateral preferences
Gravity models have become a standard workhorse model for assessing the deter-
minants of trade between countries, and in particular for focussing on the possible
impact of policies on trade. There is now a fairly extensive literature (Anderson
1979; Baier and Bergstrand 1985, 1989; Helpman and Krugman 1985; Deardorff
1998, Anderson and Wincoop 2003, Anderson and Yotov 2012, Anderson 2011,
French 2012, Head and Mayer 2013) providing theoretical justification for the
structural gravity specification, and showing that the model is consistent with
both comparative advantage models of trade, as well as imperfectly competitive
trade models.9
9 For an excellent exposition of the theoretical and empirical issues in gravity models see
Anderson (2011).
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A common formulation is to use standard Dixit-Stiglitz style CES preferences.
The structural gravity model takes the following form:
Xij = EjYi
P −1j
Ω
τ1−ij (1)
Pj =
[ j∑
i=1
p1−ij τ
1−
ij
]
(2)
Ωi =
∑
j
EiP
−1
j τ
1−
ij (3)
Where Xij gives exports from country i to country j; Ej is total expenditure
in country j; the value of output in the exporting country is given by Yi ; and τij
represents the gross bilateral costs (one plus the ad valorem trade cost (T)) such
as tariffs, of trading between i and j. Pj and Ωj are what Anderson and Wincoop
referred to as the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms respectively.
These can be interpreted as representing the average trade costs faced by the buy-
ers (inward) and sellers (outward). Pj is the price index in country j, with pij
being the price of the good being exported from i to j and  is the elasticity of
substitution parameter. Hence, exports from i to j depend on activity levels in
both countries (consumption or GDP in country j, production or GDP in country
i), tariffs between i and j and the price index in country j, relative to the price
indices in all other countries, and where these price indices depend on the costs
of trade - be this tariffs or distance between all countries, hence the notion of
multilateral resistance.
The most common use of the gravity model is at the aggregate level, though
it can also be applied at the sectoral or product level. At the aggregate level the
appropriate activity variables are the respective GDPs of the importing and ex-
porting countries. However, at the disaggregated level, comparative advantage will
influence particular sectors or products which are exported. Therefore, the correct
specification should include production in the exporting country and consumption
in the importing country at the level of aggregation at which the model is being
run.
Nevertheless a number of authors use GDP even if the model is being run at a
disaggregated level. French (2011) demonstrates that this is only correct under the
extreme assumption that the volume of trade flows is independent of the distribu-
tion of output and expenditure across product/sectors. He derives a theoretically
consistent model which provides for an alternative approach, which is to use total
trade at the given sectoral level of aggregation for the activity variables. Hence,
total sectoral exports for the exporting country, and total sectoral imports for the
importing country can be used to control for production and consumption respec-
tively.
In our case as there is only one importing country in our regressions - the EU
- any activity variable to capture consumption would be absorbed by our fixed
effects, and hence is not needed. To capture sectoral production in each export-
ing country, following French, we should use total sectoral exports. However, this
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raises two issues. First, our data consists of bilateral 10-digit flows only between
the EU and its partner countries. The data on total exports to all destinations by
each country is not available. To overcome this we can take the total exports of
each country at the relevant 6-digit level. However, this leads to the second issue
which is that at such a disaggregated level total sectoral exports may be highly
correlated with exports to the EU, which then leads to endogeneity in the regres-
sion.
There is a trade-off here. The greater the level of disaggregation used for the
activity variable, the more likely it is that there is an issue of endogeneity. And
there is no completely satisfactory way of dealing with that endogeneity as it is
impossible to find suitable instruments at this high level of disaggregation, and
the data is not suitable for GMM estimation. On the other hand, the greater the
level of aggregation used (e.g. GDP) the greater the misspecification because of
the failure to account for underlying comparative advantage. In order to deal with
this issue, and also for robustness we employed three different specifications where
we used total trade at the 2-digit level, total trade at the 6-digit level and GDP as
the activity variables. In the results reported here we use total trade calculated at
the 2-digit level. The results using 6-digit trade and GDP are highly comparable
in terms of sign and significance and are included in the Appendix D to this paper.
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) showed that the results may be sensitive to
the assumptions made about trade resistance and that the absence of the appro-
priate treatment of multilateral resistance produces biased estimates.10 Baier and
Bergstrand (2009) suggest a Taylor-series expansion approximation. Other authors
have used price indices to control for these terms. However, price indices tend to
include information on prices of non-tradable goods, and also capture both pref-
erences and distance. A common approach, suggested by Anderson and Wincoop
and subsequently employed by a number of authors, is to model this multilateral
resistance term with country fixed effects. However, country dummies may not
capture time variation of the multilateral resistance terms which would requires
the use of country-year fixed effects. In the context of our model, where we are
working at the product level, this is problematic since using product-country-year
fixed effects would not allow identification of the trade policy (tariff) variables. We
therefore use exporter-product fixed effects, and use the time variation to identify
trade policy variables at the product level.
We also follow the approach of Carrere et al.(2009) based on Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) who suggest the use of a multilateral resistance index (MRI) based on the
remoteness of the country with regards to all countries. This is constructed as the
weighted average of each country’s distance to other markets weighted by the share
of each market in world GDP. This term is sometimes incorrectly used (see Head
and Mayer, 2013) as a proxy for multilateral resistance in the spirit of Anderson
and Wincoop. In our context the MRI should be seen as a more sophisticated proxy
for relative distance which varies over time (note that with our exporter-product
10 See also Feenstra (2004), pp.144-163, and Anderson (2011) for a more detailed discussion
of these issues.
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fixed effects the standard distance variable would get dropped).
MRIit =
n∑
i=1
Yit
Ywt
log(Distij) (4)
A central concern in this paper is the treatment of tariffs, distance and trade
costs. The usual procedure in the derivation of the model (see for example Baier
and Bergstrand, 2009, Anderson and Yotov, 2012) is to assume that gross trade
costs depend on geographical and cultural proximity such as distance (Dist), com-
mon border (Border), common language or colonial ties; as well as variables related
to specific trade agreements such as tariffs (T) or preferences (Pref):
τ1−ij = e
αiDistij+α2Borderij+α3Prefij+...+αnTij (5)
An issue which then arises concerns the measurement of the preference ef-
fect. Numerous papers based on aggregate trade flows use trade regime dummies
(Prefij) to capture the role of preference such as regional trade agreements or
GSP schemes. However, this is not particularly satisfactory. The impact of pref-
erences occurs via the lower tariff paid by the exporter, and this varies by trade
regime, product and whether preferences are utilised, all of which the dummy can-
not appropriately capture. In addition, the value of the preference will depend on
the size of other countries’ tariffs for the same product - the preference margin
(Carrere et al., 2008, Low, 2009).11 Hence others (e.g. Nilsson and Matsson, 2009;
Cipollina et al., 2013) explicitly include the preference margin in order to capture
the tariff effect.12
However, this is not necessary if tariffs are correctly identified. The correct
procedure is to identify the actual tariffs paid as a result of any preferential ar-
rangement as the margin is then identified by the estimation itself. This is exactly
what we do in this paper. Our data includes the tariffs paid by all countries for all
products and all preference regimes exporting to the EU. To our knowledge our
paper is the first to precisely identify for each flow the regime of entry and the
actual tariff paid, and therefore to correctly identify the tariff effect. For example,
where there are flows from country j to the EU for a given product in a given year
but which use different regimes (eg. MFN, GSP, EBA) then these are captured
separately in our regressions.
Preferential regimes, however, are also associated with additional possible costs
and benefits in addition to the pure tariff effect. On the one hand, there may
be administrative costs of compliance with such regimes related to registration
and acquisition of valid certificates of origin. These may involve an additional
cost for exporters (Anson et al., 2005). On the other hand preferential regimes
could instead provide for more relaxed rules of origin, or may impact on trade
11 Indeed much of the policy discussion around regionalism and multilateral trade negotia-
tions has been concerned with the issue of preference erosion, and how preferential margins
are decreased as countries liberalise trade with other partners (see Low et al., 2009, Fugazza
and Nicita, 2011).
12 Cipollina et.al. derive a version of the gravity model with an explicit preference margin
term. However in order to do so a number of extreme assumptions need to be made regarding
the symmetry of trade costs
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more indirectly through the interaction between the preference regime and any
on-going trade-related technical assistance facilitating trade, and/or through any
investment, domestic or foreign, in export industries which may also have been
stimulated by the presence of the preferences. Secondary effects could, therefore,
also impact on trade positively or negatively.
Ideally we would like to capture both the direct tariff effects associated with
preferential regimes, as well as any indirect effects (e.g. incentives with regard to
investment, trade facilitation, or rules of origin). As discussed above, the direct
tariff effects we capture through the inclusion of the actual tariffs paid on each
flow. More difficult are the indirect effects. As these are not possible to explicitly
identify our strategy is twofold. First we include a dummy variable which captures
the preference regime used by each flow. Note that, unlike other papers in this
area, we can associate each flow with the actual preference regime used. Our data
allows us to identify where a product is exported by a given country to the EU
using different preference regimes. As we are already controlling for direct tariff
effects these preference dummies are designed to capture any additional impact
on trade arising from each trading regime as discussed above.13
Second, it is plausible that the indirect effects could be correlated with the
size of the preference margin, where the greater the preference margin the greater
might be the incentive, for example, for foreign direct investment in that particular
sector.14 Of course, the preference margin is not capable of identifying what the
actual mechanisms are, and is being used here as a proxy to see whether there is
any evidence of additional effect on bilateral trade. As with the use of dummies,
this is in addition to the direct tariff effects. The margin for a given product is
defined as:
Marginij = ln(1 + (T
ref − T pref )) (6)
Where T pref is the preferential tariff and T ref is the reference tariff. This
raises the question as to what is the appropriate reference tariff, T ref . Often the
preference margin is calculated in relation to the MFN tariff. However, as Low et
al. (2009) and Fugazza and Nicita (2011) suggest, this measure should be taken as
an upper bound of the preferential advantage, since in reality the margin needs to
be adjusted to the tariff paid by the main competitors in each specific product cat-
egory. As a result we use and compare the results for four different reference tariffs
capturing different degrees of competitive advantage: the MFN tariff (Margin 1),
the weighted average tariff of all exporters of that product (Margin 2), the tariff
of the largest exporter (Margin 3) and the simple average tariff of all exporters of
that product (Margin 4).
13 As an alternative we also explored using a variable which ranged between 0 and 1 for each
preference regime based on the share of trade for each country and product and time period
which enters the EU via each regime. While the results were consistent with those reported
here, these share variables are clearly the result of endogenous decisions by the exporting
firms/countries and therefore determine the composition of exports entering under different
regimes. Use of these shares is therefore problematic.
14 An oft cited classic example is the increase in textile investment in Mauritius as a result
of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act
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To summarise the preceding discussion, we use equations (1) to (6) and trans-
form into a log-linear form in order to derive what is a standard gravity equation
but at the product level. The equation we therefore estimate is given by:
log(Xikt) = β0 + β1log(HS2exportsist) + β2MRIit + β3log(1 + Tikt)
+β4Marginikt +
∑
n
γnregimen +
∑
t
δtyeart + αik + eikt
(7)
where log(Xikt) is the natural logarithm of exports of good k from country i to
the EU in period t; Tkit is the actual tariff paid by the export flow
15; marginikt
is the preference margin as defined by equation (6); log(HS2exportsist) is the
natural logarithm of country i’s total exports to the world defined at two-digit
level as discussed earlier; MRIit is as defined in equation (4); regimen are dummy
variables that indicate the preference regime used by each flow to enter the EU;
yeart is a set of year dummies.
There is an issue of the possible endogeneity between the observed trade flows
and the explanatory variables. Gravity models do not lend themselves well to IV
estimates owing to the difficulty of finding suitable instruments especially in a
panel data framework. That difficulty is compounded when dealing with trade
flows at the 10-digit level. Hence, in order to be theoretically consistent, and
following common procedure we employ resistance terms that are country and
product specific. As a result, we use αik which are exporter-product fixed effects.
These fixed effects absorb all time-invariant country and product effects, such as
distance or common language, allowing us to identify in a theoretically consistent
way the impact of tariff, margins and preferential regimes.
4 Data and Methodology
The dataset used includes export flows to the EU from 219 country partners for the
period 2002 to 2008. Export flows are disaggregated by exporting country, Com-
bined Nomenclature (CN-10) product, tariff regime and year. Such a fine level of
disaggregation allows us to handle different degrees of coverage, depth and utili-
sation of preferential regimes as described above, and is a major advantage of our
dataset. A limitation of this approach, however, is that beyond the 6-digit level,
trade classifications across countries are not harmonised. This implies that we can
only estimate the bilateral gravity model on exports to the EU, and, therefore, the
results need to be interpreted as the impact of the preferential regimes on exports
to the EU.
A key issue is that more than one export flow from the same product, country
and year is possible, since exports may enter the EU via different tariff regimes.
The tariff regimes are: MFN; GSP, GSP+ or EBA; other preferential regimes; tariff
15 For each of these flows we use the average tariff for each regime in a given year. For
example, in a given year if exports from country j using the MFN regime paid two different
MFN tariffs due to changes in the MFN structure, we use the average of both tariffs. In most
cases, however, there is only one tariff for regime and year. As discussed earlier, where there
are flows from country j to the EU for a given product in a given year but which use different
regimes (eg. MFN, GSP, EBA) then these are captured separately.
The Impact of Preferences on Developing Countries’ Exports 13
suspension, and; MFN under quota or preferential under quota. Although we can-
not identify each specific regional trade agreement, we can differentiate between
the GSP/EBA regime and Cotonou/other PTAs. For around 80% of the obser-
vations we only observe one tariff regime in the same year, but in the remaining
cases we observe more than one tariff regime (more than two in only 1 percent of
observations). Import data is then carefully matched with tariff data from TARIC,
which enables us to identify the actual tariffs paid by exporting country, CN-10
product and tariff regime. This lengthy process required conversion to ad valorem
tariffs for some agricultural products (see CARIS, 2011 for a detailed explanation).
Country, product and year flows that have more than one regime of entry to
the EU are aggregated in value, and we calculate the share of each trade regime
in the export flow and the weighted average tariff that the flow faces in the EU.16
An additional challenge is to define the preference margin for the zero flows.
For each product and year we extrapolate on the basis of the existing defined
margins for positive flows. When these are not defined, we construct the margin
according to whether the country is EBA or GSP. For EBA countries the po-
tential margin is constructed using a preferential tariff of zero. For GSP eligible
products and GSP eligible countries we use the GSP tariff (see Appendix A for a
more detailed explanation). We also use specific tariffs regarding specific country
rates due to FTAs and other specific cases that appear in the tariff book. The
main difficulty is for countries eligible for more than one preferential regime, GSP
and Cotonou, or from 2008 GSP and EPA. Since we cannot identify which regime
these countries would use for these products we use the minimum tariff available,
and when both are the same we allocate the flow to the GSP/EBA regime. This
implies that for some flows we are likely to over emphasise the role of the GSP and
EBA regimes. Our methodology minimises the risk of including potential positive
preference margins for products excluded from preferential regimes.
The final dataset has around 10.7 million trade flows, including 18,765 differ-
ent product lines. We have dropped all the product lines that disappear at some
point during the sample period and some those that are new additions to the tariff
book, mainly representing a split from other product lines due to changes in tariff
regimes or other customs controls.
Summary statistics for all the variables used in our specifications are displayed
in table 2. We consider three different samples: sample 1 includes all potential and
actual trade flows from the partners to the EU; sample 2 includes all product lines
for which there is at least one positive flow over time; sample 3 includes only pos-
itive flows. As we can see from the first column, the percentage of zero flows, that
is potential trade flows between the EU and its partners, is about 88%. Comparing
the first column with the last column gives us a first idea of which ones are the
actual EU’s trade partners and why omitting zero trade flows could be potentially
16 Trade data can be noisy due to errors when inputting customs information. In order to
detect extreme and unlikely flows, we calculate unit values and search for outliers by applying
Hadi’s (1992) filter. These extreme values are then removed from the database. In addition,
very low value flows, below 500 Euros, are also removed. These small flows are likely to be the
result of private individuals moving goods rather than firms, and therefore more likely to be
subject to proportionate errors.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Dummy=1 if Trade value>0 0.114 0.580 1
Trade value 653.358 3,498.230 5,824.980
Log of Trade value 4.624
Log of (1+Tariff) 0.025 0.028 0.031
MRI 6.574 6.511 6.493
Log of HS2exports 8.156 11.971 12.754
EBA 0.243 0.042 0.010
GSP 0.389 0.262 0.121
Other FTAs 0.236
Cotonou 0.020
GSP+ 0.019
Contiguity 0.103 0.249 0.285
Common language 0.646 0.498 0.467
Colony 0.798 0.718 0.698
Log of Distance 8.643 8.392 8.338
Margin 1 (MFN) 0.032 0.023 0.020
Margin 2 (weighted tariff) 0.009 0.002 -0.001
Margin 3 (largest export) 36.780 2.406 -0.000
Margin 4 (average tariff) 91.417 18.792 0.000
N 10,771,994 1,981,255 1,225,809
problematic. Exports to the EU come from countries with a higher level of activity
in the sector and geographically closer, as we would expect. What is noticeable is
that the products that are actually exported face higher tariffs and lower prefer-
ence margins compared to the products that are never exported (which constitute
the biggest number of observations in sample 1). Also the actual trade of products
that are covered by GSP and EBA preferences is very low compared to all of the
possible trade flows included in these preference schemes. Clearly GSP and EBA
countries have a very small export basket as summarised in table 3. Here we can
see that non-zero trade flows as a percentage of all possible trade flows, is between
3% and 3.5% for GSP countries and between 0.4% and 0.7% for EBA, much lower
than the average for all countries and as expected for the richest countries.
Descriptive statistics for the three different samples highlight that omitting all
zero flows between exporters and the EU could result in biased coefficient esti-
mates on the intensive margin, where the intensive margin of trade refers to any
changes in the level of existing trade flows. If zero flows and the decision to export
are correlated with trade costs, then using only positive flows may underestimate
the impact of different trade regimes on exports. Adding zero flows to the dataset
allows us to estimate the impact on total exports - i.e. on both the intensive and
the extensive margins (where the extensive margin refers to new products being
exported by a given country at some point during our time period to the EU,
where previously that product was not being exported by that country to the EU)
and, therefore, also on the scope for countries to diversify into new exports.
However, accommodating zero flows in our dataset is non-trivial since we are
looking at product data rather than aggregate flows. One complication arises be-
cause the dataset has a large number of products that appear and disappear during
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the years. Filling our dataset with zeros along the year dimension is problematic
due to the fact that imports from specific products on a given year may cease
because the product line no longer exists. In order to address this, product lines
that are not defined for the entire period of the sample are removed. This ensures
that we do not artificially fill with zeros a product that was not defined in the
tariff book for a given year.17,18 This reduced dataset has around 9,000 product
lines. For each product year, all exporters to the EU in that year are potential
exporters.19
There is a growing econometric literature exploring the implications of esti-
mating a log linear gravity equation in the presence of many zero trade flows (see
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Linders and de Groot (2006), Martin and Pham
(2008) or Burger et al. (2009)).
With regard to the former the recent literature has focussed on the bias in-
troduced by the log-linear transformation of the gravity equation through the
heteroskedaticity of the errors and the presence of zero-valued trade flows. Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show how the log-linearisation introduces heteroskedas-
ticity of the error term and changes its properties in such a way that the pattern
of this heteroskedasticity affects the consistency of the OLS estimator for the β co-
efficients rather than just its efficiency. Moreover the log-linear form of the model
does not deal with zero trade flows: the log of zero is undefined and these observa-
tions are dropped from the sample. Estimating the gravity equation by using only
positive trade flows introduces an additional source of bias if the zero flows are
not distributed at random but are instead the outcome of an endogenous selection.
Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator. The main advantages of the Poisson specification
in its multiplicative form with fixed effects are three: it permits controlling for
country-product heterogeneity with fixed effects, it avoids the heteroskedasticity
introduced by the log-linearisation and it includes some of the zero flows in the
estimation.20
Burger et al. (2009) note how the Poisson suffers from overdispersion, that is
when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, which quite likely
comes from unobserved heterogeneity. Not correcting for overdispersion leads to
consistent but inefficient estimates. One way to correct for this is to use a Neg-
ative Binomial (NB) regression model, a modified Poisson model which has an
extra parameter (the dispersion parameter) that models overdispersion. Another
17 In practical terms we restrict the sample to products with imports in 2002 and 2008, 2003
and 2008 or 2002 and 2007.
18 While we are aware of the recent literature on the survival of trade flows (Besedes and
Prusa, 2006) and the fact that many trade relationships may not survive more than five years,
we expect that the number of simultaneous product dropouts for all exporters in the world
to the EU in a specific year to be minimal. Therefore, the risk of eliminating products not
exported to the EU in one specific year is low.
19 The criterion is that a country should have exported at least one product to the EU
in the same year. We look at each separately in order to guarantee that Eastern European
EU countries enter the sample in the first period as exporters and after joining the EU are
considered members and not exporters.
20 Only groups for which the value of trade is different from zero in at least one period are
considered.
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Table 3 Percentage of non-zero flows by year.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GSP countries 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.030
EBA countries 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007
All countries 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.108 0.113 0.109 0.109
Countries in Top quartile of GDP 0.361 0.365 0.353 0.333 0.331 0.332 0.351
Authors’ own calculation. The table shows the percentages of non-zero flows for GSP and EBA
countries between 2002 and 2008. It then compares them with those of all countries and of the
richest countries, defined as the ones in the top quartile of the distribution of GDP.
problem that affects the Poisson model is the existence of an excessive number
of zeros in the data, that is more zeros then the model would actually predict.
Some of these excess zeros could be originated by another statistical process. In
this case a zero inflated model could be used. These models are two parts models
where one part models the zeros and the other models the positive trade flows.
Zero inflated Poisson (ZIP) and Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) are two
feasible alternatives for the Poisson model with excess zeros. However, while we
recognise the limitations of the Poisson model, the alternatives discussed above do
not handle a very high number of observations with many fixed effects - which is
what is needed here for consistency with the theoretical literature. In this paper,
therefore, together with the standard log-linear model with country-product fixed
effects we focus on the PPML with the same fixed effects.
Data on EU imports at the 10-digit level was supplied by EU Commission
services. In most specifications we follow French (2012) and use country i’s total
exports in sector s to the world minus EU, defined at the two-digit level. This
data comes from United Nations sources, the COMTRADE database for trade.
Information on distance is taken from the CEPII database whereas data on GDPs
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of three sets of regressions. We are deal-
ing with highly detailed trade data for a large number of countries where there
is a large number of zero trade flows. It is therefore important to correctly deal
with both the intensive (trade in existing products) and extensive (trade in new
products) margins of trade. We do this by first considering standard OLS esti-
mates from regressions that aim to explain the intensive margin of trade and then
with a linear probability model (LPM) which considers the determinants of the
probability of trading (extensive margin) and therefore includes all possible ob-
servations. Then we move to our final and preferred estimates, the ones produced
by the PPML estimator proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). All of the
estimations include exporter-product fixed effects. The role of preferences is best
understood by considering each of these sets of results together.
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5.1 The impact of preferences on the intensive margin of trade
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (7) with exporter-product fixed ef-
fects for positive flows only - which therefore capture the intensive margin of trade.
In column (1) we show the results where, in addition to the log of HS2exports as
activity variable and the multi-lateral resistance variable MRI, we include the
actual tariff paid by each export flow (log of (1+Tariff)).
Each of the variables has the expected sign and is statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. As expected, total product exports as a measure of sup-
ply capacity increases the level of bilateral exports. The MRI is a GDP-weighted
distance measure (Carrere, 2008; Carrere et.al., 2009; Eicher et.al 2010) where one
would expect that more remote countries would trade less and hence we would
expect a negative coefficient. This is the case in all the regressions. With regard
to our main variable of interest, tariffs, - we see that tariff reductions unambigu-
ously increase export flows to the EU. In these regressions we are picking up both
temporal variation in tariffs, and cross-country variation. As we are working with
the power of the tariff a 1 percentage point reduction in tariffs would increase
trade by b/(1 + tariff), where b is the coefficient, so in principle the marginal
effect depends on the level of the tariff. However, in practice the coefficient gives a
reasonable first order approximation to the marginal effect. In column 1, of Table
2 the coefficient is -4.09, which suggests that a one percentage point reduction in
(1 + tariff) is associated with a 4.09% increase in trade.
It is also worth noting that these results are substantially different from those
obtained by working with aggregate trade flows. In Appendix B we show the re-
sults for the same specifications as in table 4 but where we have aggregated the
trade flows such that we are dealing with total bilateral trade between each of
the countries and the EU. As found by previous authors, at the aggregate level
there is no discernible effect of tariffs on trade flows. This serves to emphasise the
importance of working with trade flows and tariffs at the product level.
In column (2) of the table we include the preference dummy variables. The
inclusion of the preference indices results in a substantial decline in the size of
the tariff coefficient which is no longer statistically significant. This is interesting.
The tariff coefficient is likely to be picking up both the direct and indirect effects
associated with preference regimes; and this specification is designed to see if, in
addition to any tariff effects, there is any evidence that the preference regimes
might increase bilateral trade. All the flows with lower tariffs enter under some
form of preference scheme, and as the dummies appear to be capturing all the
effects from those lower tariffs, there is no evidence here of any additional effects.
The column also gives some indication of the difference in the effect across the
preference regimes. The results suggest that the biggest impact compared to MFN
flows is with regard to countries that either have some form of FTA arrangement
with the EU, with a similar sized impact for the GSP+ regimes, followed by the
EBA regime. The smallest positive additional impact is for the GSP regime. The
coefficient on the Cotonou Agreement is negative.21 This may be driven by is-
21 EPA regime since 2008.
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sues such as the product coverage, or the underlying rules of origin. Other things
constant, the effect of shifting exports from MFN to an FTA is of the order of 160%.
Columns (3) to (6) decompose the impact of preferential regimes by the tariff
paid and the preference margin. This gives us the average impact attributable to
tariffs and the average impact effect given by the size of the preferential margin.
Depending on the margin used the coefficient on the tariffs is now reduced, and
the preferential margin effect varies between 2.28 and 0.12, suggesting a positive
impact of preferential margins on exports to the EU in addition to the direct tariff
effect. The size of the additional impact depends on how the margin is calculated.
The weighted tariff and the largest exporter margins probably captures best the
extent to which a given country is de facto getting preferential access, and these
suggest that there may be a more modest additional positive impact on trade than
when the MFN or average tariff margin specifications are used. Hence the impact
of preference margins on exports is reduced when we account for the degree of
competition within each product category.
In columns 7-10 we provide specifications which include all of the preceding.
Hence, we decompose the regime impact according to the tariff paid, the preferen-
tial margin enjoyed and regime specific factors proxied by the preference dummies.
We obtain a pattern of results which is highly consistent with the preceding: with
the preference dummies the tariff is no longer significant, and there is little evi-
dence of the role of the preference margins. This is because the dummies absorb all
of the effects. The preference dummies once again suggest that the larger impact
on exports arise from FTA preferences, followed by the GSP+ and EBA regimes,
and a negative impact associated with the Cotonou regime.
In conclusion, the results suggest that preferential regimes have increased ex-
ports to the EU at the intensive margin, via lower tariffs. There is also some
evidence from the regressions with the preference margins that there may be addi-
tional regime specific factors. The largest effect is associated with FTA regimes. A
potential explanation for this is that FTAs, which provide reciprocal preferences
and therefore are negotiated product by product, offer margins in products which
are more attractive for exporters or better match their export basket. Additional
reasons could be because of the greater certainty associated with FTAs, as well
as the treatment of behind the border, non-tariff measures, which is an increasing
feature in many of the EU’s agreements. With regard to the greater impact of
GSP+ and EBA, this is likely to reflect the fact that these schemes offer higher
preference margins than GSP, and provide additional evidence of the positive im-
pact of these schemes on trade. The negative Cotonou coefficient echoes previous
results in the literature (Aiello, 2010; Gamberoni, 2007), and may be driven by
the greater administrative difficulties faced by these countries in taking advantage
of these preferences. It is probably less likely to be driven by product composi-
tion effects as in principle EBA and Cotonou preferences are offered on almost all
products.
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5.2 The impact on all trade, the intensive and extensive margin of trade
In the previous section the estimations were based only on the positive trade flows
in our data-set. In so doing, the regressions focused on the impact of preference
margins on the intensive margin of trade. However, as pointed out in section ??,
omitting all zero flows between exporters and the EU can result in biased coeffi-
cient estimates. As discussed earlier, product lines that are not likely to be defined
for the entire period of our sample are removed to avoid artificially filling with
zeroes a product that was not defined in the tariff book for a given year, and
that otherwise would be considered as not exported rather than not defined. As
a result of including the large number of zero observations, and focussing just on
the intensive margin, we might expect that the coefficients on tariffs and on the
secondary preference effects (be this the preference dummies, or the preference
margins) to be smaller. This is because there are now a large number of cases
where there is no observed trade. However, at the same time, the inclusion of the
zeros also allows for changes in trade at the extensive margin.
Tables 5 presents the results for the LPM with country-product fixed effects.
The LPM models the probability of exporting to the EU and all the explanatory
variables, except for the preference dummies, are in natural logarithms. Table 6
reports the estimates obtained with the PPML estimator as proposed by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006): here equation (7) is estimated in its level-log form, with
export levels to include zero flows, and includes country-product fixed effects.
If we turn first to table 5 we see that in all the specifications we consistently
have a positive and statistically significant coefficient on tariffs and total 2-digit
exports, negative and statistically significant EBA and GSP coefficients, and typ-
ically a negative statistically significant coefficient with regard to the preference
margins. In the PPML regressions the sign is reversed for the tariff coefficient,
and typically for the preference margin coefficients. The EBA preference margin
remains negative as does the GSP coefficient (thought the latter is not significant).
This is again informative. With regard to tariffs, although the sign of the observed
effects remains the same, the magnitude of the PPML estimates differs consider-
ably from the OLS estimates with fixed effects. In particular the elasticities for
tariffs are much higher than the one found with OLS estimation.
If we take the LPM and consider the first column, the coefficient on tariffs
indicates that the higher the tariff the greater the probability of exporting, and
this is true across all the specifications. This suggests that in the EU tariffs tend
to be higher in those sectors which countries are most likely to export, which is
therefore consistent with political economy considerations with the EU protecting
those sectors where it faces more competition (eg agriculture and textiles to give
two examples).22 For specification (2) we include dummy variables only for the
22 Of course this raises issues of endogeneity which we acknowledge. However, as is well
known, dealing with endogeneity in gravity models is difficult. In a recent paper Egger et.al
(2011) instrument for preferential trading agreements in a two part model. In our case, there
is potential endogeneity between tariffs and exports, but applying the two-part model is not
possible because of the lack of appropriate instruments at the country-product-year level.
While we recognise the possibility of endogeneity, we feel our methodology is the best suited
given the nature of our dataset.
22 Xavier Cirera et al.
GSP and EBA preference regimes. We cannot include an FTA dummy, as for the
zero trade flows we have no way of knowing whether the individual products would
have had preferential access since we do not have access to all the FTA tariff sched-
ules for all the countries with the EU. This would require looking at the exclusion
lists of every FTA signed with the EU. In addition, all the product coverage of
Cotonou is included in EBA and partially in GSP, so for most Cotonou eligible
flows not exported, countries could also export using the GSP/EBA regime. Since
we do not have any information about what regime would be used if the country
could export that specific product we are constrained to use only the GSP/EBA
regime, hence these results should now be seen as being relative to the FTA (and
MFN) regimes.
In the second column of table 5 we see the negative coefficients on the EBA
and GSP preference margins. This indicates that, controlling for tariffs, the addi-
tional probability of exporting is lower where the trade flow for any given product
uses EBA preferences. An alternative way of putting this is that there is a higher
additional probability of exporting with other preference regimes, than with EBA
or GSP preferences. This result also holds with the PPML results (table 6, sec-
ond column) however, the coefficient on tariffs is negative. These differences on
the tariff coefficients arise because the LPM takes into account all possible flows
including when a given country never exports a given product to the EU. Hence
for the LPM estimations we have around 10 million observations. The PPML esti-
mator, in contrast takes into account all the products that were exported at least
once in the period to the EU by the country, since country-products with all zero
flows are collinear and dropped from the estimations, and then takes into account
the zeros for all other years.
This explains the difference between the results. There is a wide range of prod-
ucts which the EBA and GSP eligible countries never export - hence the proba-
bility of exporting is negative (LP model). However, conditional on the fact that
the product was at least exported once by the given country (Poisson model),
then once again we see the positive effect of tariff reductions on trade flows. The
difference in the EBA and GSP coefficients when comparing the intensive margin
results and where we take into account zero trade flows is interesting. If we just
consider the intensive margin we see evidence that the EBA and GSP preference
regimes may have an additional impact on trade beyond that provided by the
tariff preference. The LP and PPML results suggest that relative to FTA or MFN
preferences, if we include zero trade flows, this is no longer the case. Of course,
it is possible that relative to MFN trade flow the coefficients could be positive,
however, as it is not possible for us to distinguish between the MFN and FTA
preferences this cannot be identified.
Column 3-6 in both tables then consider the role of the preference margins. In
the LP model we see that the coefficient is negative in all cases; and it is positive
in all cases in the PPML results (except when using the simple average tariff).
The explanation here is analogous to that given earlier. The high margins tend
to be on products which are not exported by a lot of countries, hence there are
a lot of zero trade flows in the LP model associated with high margin products
leading to the negative coefficient. However, once we control for the fact that a
The Impact of Preferences on Developing Countries’ Exports 23
given product has a positive flow by the given country in at least one period,
then we see some evidence that preference margins do appear to have a positive
additional impact on trade, even when tariffs are controlled for; and also when
we include the preference dummies. This is always the case for one of our two
preferred margin specifications, the weighted average tariff; whereas the margin
based on the tariff of the largest exporter is not significant. When using the simple
average the coefficient is also not statistically significant. This result is likely to
be driven by the fact that the EBA and GSP countries tend to have very narrow
export baskets and, therefore, very large shares in zero flows. This implies that
preference margins using the simple average tariff will tend to be zero or even
negative, since the average tariff will be close to zero when including all zero flows
for EBA countries. As was the case for the intensive margin estimates the size of
the coefficients on margins drops when the degree of competition in the market is
considered.
In specifications (7) to (10) we include both the preference dummies for EBA
and GSP as well as the preference margins. These confirm the negative additional
impact of the EBA and GSP regimes on exports at the intensive and the extensive
margins relative to FTA and MFN flows. Note that as discussed above, given the
lack of information on the FTA or Cotonou regime use for zero flows, we impose on
the data that the zero flows use the GSP/EBA regime and not the Cotonou or FTA
regime and this could also result in overestimating the impact of the GSP/EBA
regime.
24 Xavier Cirera et al.
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Finally, we have also explored whether there is any evidence of the impact of
preferential regimes directly on the extensive margin of trade. To do this we esti-
mate an additional specification that uses as the dependent variable the measure
of the extensive margin proposed by Feenstra & Kee (2004). The measure is given
for each country i by the share of its export basket in world exports. In our case
since we are working with bilateral exports to the EU, the variety index reflects for
each country i, the share of world exports to the EU using country i export basket.
Appendix C shows the results for the extensive margin only estimates. Here we
see that there is no evidence that tariffs, or preference regimes have impacted on
the diversification of trade. Interestingly, it is only the GDP and the MRI variables
which appear to increase the number of varieties exported. As the MRI is a GDP-
weighted distance measure, both these results suggest that changes in trade at the
extensive margins are correlated with higher levels of GDP.
6 Conclusions
Unilateral preferences have been one of the most important instruments offered
by developed to developing countries in the last four decades to increase exports.
The existing literature provides a mixed picture regarding the effectiveness of GSP
schemes in fostering those exports. This paper provides an evaluation of the impact
of trade preferences in the EU, based on a unique dataset that links each flow with
the tariff paid and preferential regime of entry. This element is critical in order
to attribute causality between the trade policy regime and the level of export flows.
The most important finding of the paper is that we find a positive impact
of preferential regimes on exports to the EU. We find evidence that the positive
impact is transmitted directly via lower tariffs and therefore larger preferential
margins, and some evidence of additional indirect effects linked to these regimes.
Indirect regime effects appear to be larger for FTAs and then for the GSP and
EBA regimes at the intensive margin. This would suggest that the greater the
depth and range of preferences on offer the greater might be the indirect effects
on trade. The size of the preferential margin also depends on how the preference
advantage is calculated, and we show the importance of taking account of the de-
gree of competition from other export markets, when considering these additional
indirect effects.
The results regarding tariffs and margins are robust to the inclusion of both
the intensive and extensive margin in our estimations. In the OLS estimates the
largest additional impact once tariffs are controlled for was with respect to FTA
preferences; and similarly in the PPML estimates, which include both the intensive
and extensive margins we see that relative to FTA, Cotonou or MFN preferences,
there is a smaller additional effect associated with EBA and GSP flows. Consistent
with this, when we directly estimate the impact of trade on the extensive margin
using the Feenstra and Kee measure in Appendix C we do not find evidence of a
positive impact of either tariffs or margins.
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Finally it is instructive to compare our detailed results with the comparable
regression run on aggregate trade flows in Appendix B. The aggregate regressions
fail to identify the direct role of tariffs as well as the indirect effects associated
with preference regimes via the preference dummies, and to a limited extent via
the inclusion of the preference margins. This serves to highlight the importance of
assessing preferences at the most detailed level possible if one wants to correctly
identify the role of tariffs, as well as further effects.
More work is required in order to understand the diverse impact of different
preferential regimes. It is possible that this is due to the different product cover-
age of each regime, and the possibility that especially FTAs offer preferences in
key export products where margins play a more important role. Other potential
explanations are the role of rules of origin, other non-tariff barriers; or investment
effects linked to the trade regimes.
The Impact of Preferences on Developing Countries’ Exports 27
Appendix A: Methodology for the zero flows dataset
The main challenges when calculating the zero flows dataset are:
– differentiating products that disappear due to changes in classification;
– inferring tariffs for trade flows that do not occur.
Selecting products that occur all the period
We select only those product lines that are exported most of the period. This
implies selecting those exported in 2002 and 2008, those in 2003 and 2008, and
those exported in 2002 and 2007. In total we select 9,068 (over 19,259 products
defined in some year) product lines that represent 73.31% of value and 71.50% of
flows. Inference of tariffs for no flows
For all the zero flows, we use the following procedure. We use the complete
tariff book and paste tariffs in the following order.
– First we attach country specific duties, which are the result of FTAs or specific
situations
– We set tariffs to 0, when MFN rates are 0.
– We use zero tariffs for all EBA countries
– We use GSP plus tariffs for GSP+ countries
– With countries with double membership GSP and Cotonou, and in 2008 GSP
and EPA, we use the minimum tariff. When both are the same we group the
country with the GSP regime.
– Remaining tariffs are set to MFN rates
We create a dummy variable which indicates whether the tariff applied belongs to
the GSP/EBA regime. Since in the case of multiple preferential regimes we do not
know what regime would be utilised for zero flows, the results of the coefficient on
the margin decomposition needs to be interpreted with caution.
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